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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
322 State Capitol Buildin 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 _ _ _ _ _ 
Re: Madsen v. Prudential 
Case No. 860148 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter (and nine copies) is submitted on behalf 
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association under Rule 
24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Please bring the 
letter to the attention of the Court. 
The recent case of Lilieberq v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp., U.S. , 56 U.S.L.W. 4637 (U.S. June 
17, 1988) (No. 86-957) is additional authority for five 
arguments made by Prudential in the Brief of Respondent and in 
the Supplemental Brief of Respondent. Each is discussed 
below. A copy of Lilieberq is enclosed. 
First, Lilieberq holds a judge must be disqualified in 
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned. Id. at 4641-4642. This supports Point III A (at 
22-27) in the Brief of Respondent. 
Second, Lilieberq holds disqualification for 
appearance of bias relates back and renders void the 
discretionary judicial acts taken by the trial judge. If a 
judgment was entered, it is vacated and a new trial granted, 
especially when the opposing party has not made a showing of 
"special hardship" by reason of his or her reliance on the 
original judgment. Id. at 4641-4642, 4643. This supports 
Point VI B (at 48-50) in the Brief of Respondent and Point II 
(at 3-4) in the Supplemental Brief of Respondent. 
Third, in reaching its decision in Lilieberq, the 
Supreme Court deferred to the findings made by the lower 
courts, both on the issue of bias and on the selection of the 
appropriate remedy (vacation of the judgment) to correct the 
problem. Id. at 4641-4642. This supports Point I (at 12) in 
the Brief of Respondent and Point I (at 1-3) in the 
Supplemental Brief of Respondent. 
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s warranted "no matter how insubstantial 
and regardless of whether or not the 
es an appearance of impropriety." Id. 
Fifth, the Court noted that one of its prior 
decisions, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 
(1986), is best understood as a description of the 
constitutional dimensions of disqualification, because of 
appearance of bias, under the Due Process Clause, id. at 4642, 
N. 12. That supports Point III B (at 30) in the Brief of 
Respondent. 
Very truly yours, 
MOYLE ^DRAPER, P.C. 
cULw^—-—. 
oseprr j.x Palmer 
Attorneys for Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan 
Association 
cc: Robert J. Debry, of 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Peter W. Billings, of 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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would be subject to suit under certain circumstances. The 
majority notes, correctly, that civil enforcement actions are 
maintainable pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 1132. The majority 
points further to certain suits that may be brought "against 
ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law claims . . . ." 
Ante, at 6-7. The Court reasons that, as ERISA does not 
provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments 
won in such suits, Congress must have intended that state-
law methods of collection remain undisturbed. 
This argument has no relevance to the issue before us. 
The question we face is not whether garnishment may be 
used to enforce a valid judgment obtained against an ERISA 
plan. When garnishment is so used, its process issues 
against some third party who owes the plan a debt or who has 
property in his possession in which the plan has an interest. 
The significant burdens of complying with the garnishment 
order fall on the plan's debtor, not on the plan. The issue we 
•face in this case is quite different: it is whether an ERISA 
benefit plan may be forced to act as a garnishee by creditors 
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. Because the 
Court fails to analyze the different contexts in which state 
garnishment laws may affect ERISA plans, its conclusion 
that such laws are never pre-empted is far too broad. And 
while the Court's conclusion may be valid in garnishment pro-
ceedings where an ERISA plan is the debtor, it is plainly un-
warranted in situations where, as here, the plan is a gar-
nishee. For it is in the latter situation that plans face the 
repetitious and costly burden of monitoring controversies in-
volving hundreds of beneficiaries and participants in various 
states. 
Further, it assumes the point in issue to say that the 
Court's conclusion is required by cases holding that a "sue-
and-be-suedw clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to 
garnishment and other state-law procedures for enforcing 
judgments. See ante, at 8, n. 9, citing Franchise Tax Board 
of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512 (1984), and FHA v. 
Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940). The sue-and-be-sued clause in 
each of those cases was a waiver of the sovereign immunity 
that otherwise would have protected certain federal agencies 
from legal process, including writs of garnishment. In that 
context, it was perfectly sensible to "presum[e] that when 
Congress launched a governmental agency into the commer-
cial world and endowed it with authority to 'sue or be sued,' 
that agency is no less amenable to judicial process that a pri-
vate enterprise under like circumstances would be." FHA 
v. Burr, supra, at 245. In the ERISA context, by contrast, 
§514 substantively limits the States' ability to treat employee 
benefit plans as they may treat any commercial enterprise. 
Our cases finding several state-law causes of action pre-
empted establish at least this much. See, e. g., Pilot Life, 
481 U. S., at (holding that certain contract and tort 
laws, though otherwise generally applicable, may not be in-
voked against an employee benefit plan); Shaw, 463 U. S., at 
103-106 (finding certain fair employment laws pre-empted). 
The second argument on which the Court relies is that the 
conclusion that §514 preempts the state statutes at issue in 
this case would render redundant the bar against alienation 
or assignment of pension benefits set forth in ERISA 
§206(d)(l), 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1). See ante, at 11. This 
provision prohibits any assignment, whether voluntary or in-
voluntary, of pension plan assets. Under the view the Court 
rejects, § 514(a) would prohibit involuntary assignments of 
pension and welfare plan assets because such assignments 
necessarily would be effected by application of state laws, 
like the Georgia laws at issue in this case, that are pre-
empted. I agree with the Court that ordinarily the partial 
—J—J—„„r ^ Q atotntnrv command, such as would result 
from the interpretation of § 514 that the Court rejects, is not 
lightly to be inferred. Nevertheless, I believe there are two 
reasons why this consideration is not weighty in the present 
context. 
First, the alternative construction adopted by the Court 
results in the total redundancy of § 514(b)(7), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. III). It is preferable, in my 
view, to tolerate the partial overlap rejected by the Court 
than to construe § 514 so as to render another section of the 
statute surplus in its entirety. Second, the deliberate, ex-
pansive reach of § 514 necessarily encompasses many state 
laws that would be pre-empted even in the absence of its 
broad mandate, solely on the basis of their conflict with 
ERISA's substantive requirements. Some degree of overlap 
is a necessary concomitant of the approach to pre-emption 
chosen by Congress. The partial redundancy which the 
Court strives to avoid is essentially analogous to a host of 
like overlaps that Congress must have foreseen. To suggest 
that this type of overlap is sufficient to call into question the 
applicability of § 514 is to defeat the very purpose for which 
it was enacted. I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion 
that petitioners must comply with the garnishment orders at 
issue in this case. 
ERNEST L. MATHEWS JR., New York, N.Y. (THOMAS W. 
GLEASON, FARRINGTON & ABBOTT, P C , CHARLES R. 
GOLDBURG, and KEVIN MARRINAN, on the briefs) for petition-
ers; BRIAN J. MARTIN, Assistant to the Solicitor General 
(CHARLES FRIED, Sol. Gen., DONALD B. AYER, Dpt>. Sol. 
Gen., CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., 
GEORGE R. SALEM, Sol. of Labor, ALLEN H. FELDMAN, 
Assoc. Sol., CAROL A. DE DEO, Dpty. Assoc. Sol., and BETTE J. 
BRIGGS, Labor Dept. atty., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus curiae; 
MAUREEN E. MAHONEY, Washington, D.C. (LATHAM & 
WATKINS, on the briefs) as amicus curiae, in support of the judg-
ment below. 
No. 86-957 
JOHN A. LILJEBERG, JR., PETITIONER v. HEALTH 
SERVICES ACQUISITION CORP. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 86-957. Argued December 9, 1987-Reargued April 25, 1988-
Decided June 17, 1988 
In 1977, pursuant to a plan to construct and operate a hospital in Kenner, 
Louisiana, petitioner formed a corporation (St. Jude) to apply for the 
necessary state "certificate of need.*' During the next two years peti-
tioner negotiated with Loyola University over a proposal to purchase as 
the hospital site a portion of Loyola's Kenner land for several million 
dollars, coupled with a plan to rezone Loyola's adjoining land to greatly 
increase its value. Federal District Court Judge Robert Collins was a 
member, and regularly attended the meetings, of Loyola's Board of 
Trustees, whose minutes indicated regular discussions of the negotia-
tions' progress and reflected the fact that Loyola's interest in the project 
was dependent on the issuance of the certificate. Petitioner also con-
ducted negotiations with respondent's corporate predecessor (HAD, cul-
minating in HAI's purchase of a Kenner site not owned by Loyola and its 
filing of the certificate application upon petitioner's execution of an 
agreement which HAI believed gave it title to St. Jude. After the cer-
tificate was issued in St. Jude's name, and a dispute between petitioner 
and HAI arose as to St. Jude's ownership, petitioner's proposal to re-
open the Loyola negotiations was discussed and formally approved at the 
Board's meeting on November 12, 1981, which Judge Collins attended. 
On November 30, 1981, respondent filed suit in the District Court seek-
ing a declaration of ownership of St. Jude. Judge Collins, sitting with-
out a jury, tried the case on January 21 and 22, 1982, immediately an-
nouncing his intention to rule for petitioner. On January 28, 1982, at a 
6 LW 4638 The United States LAW WEEK 6-14-88 
meeting which Judge Collins did not attend, the Loyola Board discussed 
the terms of an agreement of sale with petitioner, which provided, inter 
alia, that it would be void if petitioner failed to satisfy certain conditions, 
the fulfillment of which depended on his retention of control over the cer-
tificate. Judge Collins did not read the minutes of that meeting until 
March 24, 1982. In the meantime, on March 16, he entered judgment 
for petitioner, crediting petitioner's version of crucial, disputed con-
versations. Ten months after the Court of Appeals affirmed that judg-
ment, respondent, having just learned that Judge Collins was associated 
with Loyola while petitioner and the University were engaged in negoti-
ations concerning the hospital site, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment on the ground that 
Judge Collins was disqualified under 28 U. S. C. § 455. Judge Collins 
denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to a 
different judge, who also denied the motion on the ground that, although 
the evidence gave rise to an appearance of impropriety, Judge Collins 
lacked actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the litigation during the 
trial and prior to the filing of the judgment. The Court of Appeals again 
reversed, ruling that the appearance of impropriety is a sufficient 
ground for disqualification under § 455(a). Moreover, the court ruled 
that vacatur was an appropriate remedy in these circumstances. 
Held: 
•1. A violation of § 455(a)—which requires a judge to disqualify himself 
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned—is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant 
facts, would expect that a judge knew of circumstances creating an ap-
pearance of partiality, notwithstanding a finding that the judge was not 
actually conscious of those circumstances. To require scienter as an ele-
ment of a § 455(a) violation would contravene that section's language and 
its purpose of promoting public confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
system. This reading of § 455(a) does not require judges to perform the 
impossible by disqualifying themselves based on facts they do not know, 
since, in proper cases, the provision can be applied retroactively to rec-
tify an oversight once the judge concludes that "his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned." Here, where both lower courts found an 
ample basis in the record for concluding that an objective observer would 
have questioned Judge Collins' impartiality, his failure to disqualify him-
self was a plain violation of § 455(a) even though it was initially the prod-
uct of a temporary lapse of memory. 
2. Vacatur was a proper remedy for the § 455(a) violation in the cir-
cumstances of this case. In determining whether a § 455 violation re-
quires vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6)—which gives federal courts broad au-
thority to grant relief from a final judgment "upon such terms as are 
just," provided that the motion is made within a reasonable time—it is 
appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the particular parties, the 
risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the 
risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. 
Here, despite his lack of actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the dis-
pute during trial, Judge Collins' participation in the case created a strong 
appearance of impropriety, particularly in light of his regular attendance 
at Board meetings, including the one on November 12, 1982, and the fi-
nancial importance of the project to Loyola; his failure to attend the Jan-
uary 28, 1982, meeting or to read the minutes of that meeting before en-
tering judgment; his inexcusable failure to recuse himself or disclose his 
interest on March 24, 1982, when respondent still had time to file a new-
trial motion or to use the failure as an issue on direct appeal; and his fail-
ure to acknowledge, in denying the motion to vacate, that he had known 
about Loyola's interest both shortly before and shortly after trial, or to 
indicate any awareness of a duty to recuse himself in March 1982. 
Moreover, vacatur here will not produce injustice in other such cases, 
and may, in fact, prompt other judges to more carefully search for and 
disclose disqualification grounds. Furthermore, a careful study of the 
merits of the underlying litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of 
unfairness in upholding the judgment for petitioner than in allowing a 
new trial, while neither petitioner nor Loyola has made a showing of spe-
cial hardship by reason of their reliance on the original judgment. Fi-
nally, although a 10-month delay would normally foreclose vacatur based 
on a 5 455(a) violation, the delay here is excusable since it is entirely 
attributable to Judge Collins' conduct. 
796 F. 2d 796, affirmed. 
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, 
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and SC\LIA, JJ., joined. 
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Stat. 1609. The first sentence of the amendment provides: 
"Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States 
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 455(a) as amended. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that a violation of § 455(a) is established when 
a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would ex-
pect that a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circum-
stances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding 
a finding that the judge was not actually eonscious of those 
circumstances. Moreover, although the judgment in ques-
tion had become final, the Court of Appeals determined that 
under the facts of this case, the appropriate remedy was to 
vacate the court's judgment. We granted certiorari to con-
sider its construction of § 455(a) as well as its remedial deci-
sion. 480 U. S. . We now affirm. 
I 
In November 1981, respondent Health Services Acquisi-
tion Corp. brought an action against petitioner John Lilje-
berg, Jr., seeking a declaration of ownership of a corporation 
known as St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana (St. Jude). 
The case was tried by Judge Robert Collins, sitting without a 
jury. Judge Collins found for Liljeberg and, over a strong 
dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Approximately 10 
months later, respondent learned that Judge Collins had been 
a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola University 
while Liljeberg was negotiating with Loyola to purchase a 
parcel of land on which to construct a hospital. The success 
and benefit to Loyola of these negotiations turned, in large 
part, on Liljeberg prevailing in the litigation before Judge 
Collins. 
Based on this information, respondent moved pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judg-
ment on the ground that Judge Collins was disqualified under 
§455 at the time he heard the action and entered judgment in 
favor of Liljeberg. Judge Collins denied the motion and re-
spondent appealed. The Court of Appeals determined that 
resolution of the motion required factual findings concerning 
the extent and timing of Judge Collins, knowledge of Loyola's 
interest in the declaratory relief litigation. Accordingly, the 
panel reversed and remanded the matter to a different judge 
for such findings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. On remand, 
the District Court found that based on his attendance at 
Board meetings Judge Collins had actual knowledge of Loy-
ola's interest in St. Jude in 1980 and 1981. The court further 
concluded, however, that Judge Collins had forgotten about 
Loyola's interest by the time the declaratory judgment suit 
came to trial in January 1982. On March 24, 1982, Judge 
Collins reviewed materials sent to him by the Board to pre-
pare for an upcoming meeting. At that time—just a few 
days after he had filed his opinion finding for Liljeberg and 
still within the 10-day period allowed for filing a motion for a 
new trial—Judge Collins once again obtained actual knowl-
edge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude. Finally, the District 
Court found that although Judge Collins thus lacked actual 
knowledge during trial and prior to the filing of his opinion, 
the evidence nonetheless gave rise to an appearance of im-
propriety. However, reading the Court of Appeals' man-
date as limited to the issue of actual knowledge, the District 
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The Court of Appeals again reversed. The court first 
noted that Judge Collins should have immediately disquali-
fied himself when his actual knowledge of Loyola's interest 
was renewed.1 The court also found that regardless of 
Judge Collins' actual knowledge, "a reasonable observer 
would expect that Judge Collins would remember that Loyola 
had some dealings with Liljeberg and St. Jude and seek to 
ascertain the nature of these dealings." 796 F. 2d 7%, 
803 (1986). Such an appearance of impropriety, in the view 
of the Court of Appeals, was sufficient ground for disquali-
fication under § 455(a). Although recognizing that caution 
is required in determining whether a judgment should be va-
cated after becoming final, the court concluded that since 
the appearance of partiality was convincingly established and 
since the motion to vacate was filed as promptly as possible, 
the appropriate remedy was to vacate the declaratory relief 
judgment. Because the issues presented largely turn on the 
facts as they give rise to an appearance of impropriety, it 
is necessary to relate the sequence and substance of these 
events in some detail. 
II 
Petitioner, John Liljeberg, Jr., is a pharmacist, a pro-
moter, and a half-owner of Axel Realty, Inc., a real estate 
brokerage firm. In 1976, he became interested in a project 
to construct and operate a hospital in Kenner, Louisiana, a 
suburb of New Orleans. In addition to providing the com-
munity with needed health care facilities, he hoped to obtain 
a real estate commission for Axel Realty and the exclusive 
right to provide pharmaceutical services at the new hospital. 
The successful operation of such a hospital depended upon 
the acquisition of a "certificate of need" from the State of 
Louisiana; without such a certificate the hospital would not 
qualify for health care reimbursement payments under the 
federal medicare and medicaid programs.2 Accordingly, in 
October 1979, Liljeberg formed St. Jude, intending to have 
the corporation apply for the certificate of need at an appro-
priate time. 
During the next two years Liljeberg engaged in serious 
negotiations with at least two major parties. One set of 
negotiations involved a proposal to purchase a large tract of 
land from Loyola University for use as a hospital site, cou-
pled with a plan to rezone adjoining University property. 
The proposed benefits to the University included not only the 
proceeds of the real estate sale itself, amounting to several 
million dollars, but also a substantial increase in the value to 
the University of the rezoned adjoining property. The prog-
ress of these negotiations was regularly reported to the Uni-
versity's Board of Trustees by its Real Estate Committee 
and discussed at Board meetings. The minutes of those 
meetings indicate that the University's interest in the project 
was dependent on the issuance of the certificate of need.8 
1
 Because the court concluded that the judgment should be vacated 
based on an appearance of impropriety that permeated the entire proceed-
ing, it declined to decide on the appropriate remedy for a judge's failure to 
promptly disqualify himself after the entry of judgment but prior to expira-
tion of the time allowed for filing certain motions. 
•See 42 U. S. C. §1320a-l (1982 ed., and Supp. III). As the Court 
of Appeals noted, "(without reimbursement, it is impractical (if not impos-
sible) to operate a hospital." App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a, n. 1. 
•The District Court found: 
"Discussions of the St. Jude Hospital project are reflected in the minutes 
of the next meeting of the Board of Trustees on January 24, 1980, which 
Judge Collins attended. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 22. Lu>berg's first offer 
on behalf of St. Jude Properties to purchase approximately 75 acres of Loy-
ola's Kenner property was presented in a Real Estate Committee report, 
which was summarized in the Board minutes. The minutes also include 
the response of Loyola University to LUjeberg, including the Committee's 
expression of interest in continuing negotiations with St. Jude Properties. 
Liljeberg was also conducting serious negotiations with re-
spondent's corporate predecessor, Hospital Affiliates In-
ternational (HAD, a national health management company. 
In the summer of 1980, Liljeberg and HAI reached an agree-
ment in principle, outlining their respective roles in de-
veloping the hospital. The agreement contemplated that 
HAI would purchase a tract of land in Kenner (not owned by 
the University) and construct the hospital on that land; pre-
pare and file the certificate of need; and retain Liljeberg as 
a consultant to the hospital in various capacities. In turn, it 
was understood that Liljeberg would transfer St. Jude to 
HAI. Pursuant to this preliminary agreement, various doc-
uments were executed, including an agreement by HAI to 
purchase the tract of land from its owner for five million 
dollars and a further agreement by HAI to place $500,000 in 
escrow. In addition, it was agreed that Axel Realty, Inc., 
would receive a $250,000 commission for locating the prop-
erty. Eventually, Liljeberg signed a "warranty and indem-
nity agreement," which HAI understood to transfer owner-
ship of St. Jude to HAI. After the warranty and indemnity 
agreement was signed, HAI filed an application for the cer-
tificate of need. 
On August 26,1981, the certificate of need was issued and 
delivered to Liljeberg. He promptly advised HAI4 and 
HAI paid the real estate commission to Axel Realty. A dis-
pute arose, however, over whether the warranty and indem-
nity agreement did in feet transfer ownership of St, Jude 
to HAI. Liljeberg contended that the transfer of ownership 
of St. Jude—and hence, the certificate of need—was condi-
tioned upon reaching a final agreement concerning his contin-
ued participation in the hospital project. This contention 
was not supported by any written instrument. HAI denied 
that there was any such unwritten understanding and in-
sisted that, by virtue of the warranty and indemnity agree-
ment, it had been sole owner of St. Jude for over a year. 
The dispute gave rise to this litigation. 
Respondent filed its complaint for declaratory judgment on 
November 30, 1981. The case was tried by Judge Collins, 
sitting without a jury, on January 21 and January 22, 1982. 
At the close of the evidence, he announced his intended rul-
ing, and on March 16, 1982, he filed a judgment (dated Mar. 
12, 1982) and his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He 
credited Liljeberg's version of oral conversations that were 
disputed and of critical importance in his ruling.5 
The minutes further reflect the Real Estate Committee's communication to 
LiJjeberg that "until a certificate of need were forthcoming, Loyola would 
more than likely not be interested in the project/ The minutes outline the 
terms of a second offer received by Loyola University from St. Jude Prop-
erties raising the purchase price by $7,000.00 per acre, *with no financing 
necessary and no commitments of any kind except the dedication of 110 feet 
for roadway purposes, with the improvement cost paid totally by the Lilje-
berg group/ The minutes elaborate on the details of the offer, including 
St Jude Properties' desire for a sixty day period to secure financing to 
finalize the sale." App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-20a. 
4Coincidentally, HAI was acquired by Hospital Corporation of America 
on August 26, 1981, through a merger of HAI and respondent, Health 
Services Acquisition Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Hospital Cor-
poration of America. For convenience, we shall continue to describe this 
entity as HAI. 
'For example, Liljeberg's attorney testified that before returning the 
signed copy of the warranty and indemnity agreement to HAI, he told 
HATs associate corporate counsel that Liljeberg would not transfer owner-
ship of St. Jude until they reached a binding agreement concerning Lilje-
berg's continued participation in the hospital project. HAI's associate cor-
porate counsel testified that no such conversation occurred. App. to Pet. 
for Cert 61a, n. 3. 
Although noting this conflicting testimony, the Fifth Circuit held on ap-
peal that Judge Collins did not abuse his discretion in awarding the certifi-
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aring the period between November 30,1981, and March 
1982, Judge Collins was a trustee of Loyola University, 
was not conscious of the fact that the University and 
*berg were then engaged in serious negotiations concern-
he Kenner hospital project, or of the further fact that the 
ess of those negotiations depended upon his conclusion 
Liljeberg controlled the certificate of need. To deter-
e whether Judge Collins' impartiality in the Lijjeberg liti-
on "might reasonably be questioned," it is appropriate to 
ader the state of his knowledge immediately before the 
juit was filed, what happened while the case was pending 
>re him, and what he did when he learned of the Universi-
interest in the litigation. 
fter the certificate of need was issued, and Liljeberg and 
I became embroiled in their dispute, Liljeberg reopened 
negotiations with the University. On October 29, 1981, 
Real Estate Committee sent a written report to each of 
trustees, including Judge Collins, advising them of "a sig-
ant change" concerning the proposed hospital in Kenner 
stating specifically that Loyola's property had "again 
>me a prime location." App. 72. The Committee sub-
bed a draft of a resolution authorizing a University vice-
rident "to continue negotiations with the developers of 
St. Jude Hospital." Id., at 73. At the Board meeting 
November 12, 1981, which Judge Collins attended, the 
Jtees discussed the connection between the rezoning 
Loyola's land in Kenner and the St. Jude project and 
pted the Real Estate Committee's proposed resolution, 
is, Judge Collins had actual knowledge of the University's 
ential interest in the St. Jude hospital project in Kenner 
: a few days before the complaint was filed. 
Vhile the case was pending before Judge Collins, the Uni-
sity agreed to sell 80 acres of its land in Kenner to 
ieberg for $6,694,000. The progress of negotiations was 
mssed at a Board meeting on January 28, 1982. Judge 
lins did not attend that meeting, but the Real Estate 
nmittee advised the trustees that "the federal courts have 
ermined that the certificate of need will be awarded to the 
Jude Corporation." Id., at 37. Presumably this advice 
3 based on Judge Collins' comment at the close of the hear-
a week earlier, when he announced his intended ruling 
ause he thought "it would be unfair to keep the parties in 
ibt as to how I feel about the case." App. to Pet. for 
rt. 41a. 
[lie formal agreement between Liljeberg and the Univer-
f was apparently executed on March 19th. App. 50-58. 
B agreement stated that it was not in any way conditioned 
Liljeberg's prevailing in the litigation "pending in the 
S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
. involving the obtaining by [Liljeberg] of a Certificate of 
i to Liljeberg. Judge Rubin, in dissent, pointed to another example of 
ere Liljeberg received the benefit of the doubt on a critical disputed 
t. Lijjeberg's attorney received the proposed warranty and indemnity 
•eement from HAI under cover of a letter which stated:".. . I believe 
i is the only document. . . that would be needed in effecting the trans-
." Id., at 60a, n. 2. Liljeberg's attorney testified, however, that he 
not read the letter of transmittal. Yet, as Judge Rubin observed: 
It is curious that a lawyer would fail to read a letter that comes to him 
ached to an important document. It is curiouser, as Alice said, after 
> had passed through the looking glass into Wonderland, that Liljeberg, 
o repeatedly testified that he distrusted HAI although he had contem-
ned entering into a complex and potentially lucrative relationship with 
i corporation, designed to operate over a seven-year period, did not 
rpond to the cover letter. . . . 
. is curiouser still that [Liljeberg's attorney], who testified that he did 
t read the cover letter, nevertheless knew that HAI believed that the 
irranty and Indemnity Agreement was sufficient to transfer 'owner-
Need," id., at 55, but it also gave the University the right to 
repurchase the property for the contract price if Liljeberg 
had not executed a satisfactory construction contract within 
one year and further provided for nullification of the contract 
in the event the rezoning of the University's adjoining land 
was not accomplished. Thus, the University continued to 
have an active interest in the outcome of the litigation be-
cause it was unlikely that Liljeberg could build the hospital 
if he lost control of the certificate of need; moreover, the re-
zoning was in turn dependent on the hospital project.6 
The details of the transaction were discussed in three let-
ters to the trustees dated March 12, March 15, and March 19, 
1982, but Judge Collins did not examine any of those letters 
until shortly before the Board meeting on March 25, 1982. 
Thus, he acquired actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in 
the litigation on March 24, 1982. As the Court of Appeals 
correctly held, "Judge Collins should have recused himself 
when he obtained actual knowledge of that interest on March 
24." 7% F. 2d, at 801. 
In considering whether the Court of Appeals properly va-
cated the declaratory relief judgment, we are required to 
address two questions. We must first determine whether 
§ 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality, 
even though the judge was not conscious of the circumstances 
creating the appearance of impropriety, and second, whether 
relief is available under Rule 60(b) when such a violation is 
not discovered until after the judgment has become final. 
Ill 
Title 28 U. S. C. §455 provides in relevant part:7 
"(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
"(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the fallowing 
circumstances: 
"(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fidu-
ciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his 
household, has a financial interest in the subject 
'As the Court of Appeals pointed out: 
The district court's determination that Loyola's interest in the litigation 
terminated as of March 19,1982 is clearly erroneous. Although the agree-
ment between Loyola and Lujeberg was not contingent on the outcome of 
the lawsuit, as a practical matter Loyola still had a substantial interest in 
Iceberg's obtaining the certificate of approval. Without the certificate, 
it is very likely that Liljeberg would not have been able to build the hospi-
tal on the Monroe Tract. The construction of a hospital on its property 
was extremely important to Loyola as shown by the fact that Loyola was 
allowed under its agreement with Lujeberg to repurchase the land if a hos-
pital was not built. Furthermore, the construction of a hospital on the 
Monroe Tract was critical to the effort to rezone the surrounding property 
owned by Loyola; the rezoning was also of vital interest to Loyola. There-
fore, Loyola's interest in the litigation did not terminate as of March 19, 
1962 and Judge Collins should have recused himself when he obtained ac-
tual knowledge of that interest on March 24." 796 JF\ 2d, at 800-801. 
T
 Prior to the 1974 amendments, §455 simply provided: 
"Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has 
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or 
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the 
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein." 62 Stat. 908. 
The statute was amended in 1974 to clarify and broaden the grounds for 
judicial disqualification and to conform with the recently adopted ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (1984). See S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 1 
(1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, pp. 1-2 (1974). The general language of 
subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity 
of judicial process by replacing the subjective In his opinion" standard 
with an objective test. See S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); H. R. Rep. 
No. 93-1453, at 5. 
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matter in controversy or in a party to the proceed-
ing, or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 
"(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal 
and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable 
effort to inform himself about the personal financial in-
terests of his spouse and minor children residing in his 
household." 
Scienter is not an element of a violation of § 455(a). The 
judge's lack of knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance may 
bear on the question of remedy, but it does not eliminate the 
risk that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" 
by other persons. To read § 455(a) to provide that the judge 
must know of the disqualifying facts, requires not simply ig-
noring the language of the provision—which makes no men-
tion of knowledge—but further requires concluding that the 
language in subsection (b)(4)—which expressly provides that 
the judge must know of his or her interest—is extraneous. 
A careful reading of the respective subsections makes clear 
that Congress intended to require knowledge under subsec-
tion (b)(4) and not to require knowledge under subsection 
(a).' Moreover, advancement of the purpose of the pro-
vision—to promote public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial process, see S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 5 (1973); 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1974)-does not depend upon 
whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an 
appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might rea-
sonably believe that he or she knew. As Chief Judge Clark 
of the Court of Appeals explained: 
"The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appear-
ance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable 
person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would 
give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance 
of partiality is created even though no actual partiality 
exists because the judge does not recall the facts, be-
cause the judge actually has no interest in the case or be-
cause the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The 
judge's forgetfulness, however, is not the sort of objec-
tively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of 
partiality. Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 
F. 2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983). Under section 455(a), 
therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks 
actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or 
bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the 
circumstances, would expect that the judge would have 
actual knowledge." 796 F. 2d, at 802. 
'Petitioner contends that 5 455(a) must be construed in light of 
% 455(bX4). He argues that the reference to knowledge in § 455(b)(4) indi-
cates that Congress must have intended that scienter be an element under 
§ 455(a) as well. Petitioner reasons that 1455(a) is a catchall provision, 
encompassing all of the specifically enumerated grounds for disqualification 
under § 455(b), as well as other grounds not specified. Not requiring 
knowledge under $ 455(a), m petitioner's view, would thus render mean-
ingless the knowledge requirement under §455(bX4). The requirement 
could always be circumvented by simply moving for disqualification under 
1455(a), rather than § 455(b). 
Petitioner's argument ignores important differences between subsec-
tions (a) and (bX4). Most importantly, § 455(b)(4) requires disqualifica-
tion no matter how insubstantial the financial interest and regardless of 
whether or not the interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety. 
See § 455(d)(4); In re Cement and Concrete Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076 
(Ariz. 1981), mandamus denied, 688 F. 2d 1297 (CAS 1982), aff'd by the ab-
sence of quorum, 459 U. S. 1191 (1983). In addition, § 455(e) specifies that 
a judge may not accept a waiver of any ground for disqualification under 
1455(b), but may accept such a waiver under § 455(a) after ua full disclo-
sure on the record of the basis for disqualification." Section 455(b) is 
therefore a somewhat stricter provision, and thus is not simply redundant 
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, this reading of the 
statute does not call upon judges to perform the impossible— 
to disqualify themselves based on facts they do not know. 
If, as petitioner argues, § 455(a) should only be applied pro-
spectively, then requiring disqualification based on facts the 
judge does not know would of course be absurd; a judge could 
never be expected to disqualify himself based on some fact he 
does not know, even though the fact is one that perhaps he 
should know or one that people might reasonably suspect 
that he does know. But to the extent the provision can also, 
in proper cases, be applied retroactively, the judge is not 
called upon to perform an impossible feat. Rather, he is 
called upon to rectify an oversight and to take the steps nec-
essary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary. If he concludes that "his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned," then he should also find that the stat-
ute has been violated. This is certainly not an impossible 
task. No one questions that Judge Collins could have dis-
qualified himself and vacated his judgment when he finally 
realized that Loyola had an interest in the litigation. The 
initial appeal was taken from his failure to disqualify himself 
and vacate the judgment after he became aware of the ap-
pearance of impropriety, not from his failure to disqualify 
himself when he first became involved in the litigation and 
lacked the requisite knowledge. 
In this case both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals found an ample basis in the record for concluding 
that an objective observer would have questioned Judge Col-
lins' impartiality. Accordingly, even though his failure to 
disqualify himself was the product of a temporary lapse of 
memory, it was nevertheless a plain violation of the terms 
of the statute. 
A conclusion that a statutory violation occurred does not, 
however, end our inquiry. As in other areas of the law, 
there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy 
judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circum-
stance.* There need not be a draconian remedy for every 
violation of § 455(a). It would be equally wrong, however, to 
adopt an absolute prohibition against any relief in cases in-
volving forgetful judges. 
IV 
Although §455 defines the circumstances that mandate dis-
qualification of federal judges, it neither prescribes nor pro-
hibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty. 
Congress has wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of 
fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose of 
the legislation. In considering whether a remedy is appro-
priate, we do well to bear in mind that in many cases—and 
this is such an example—the Court of Appeals is in a better 
position to evaluate the significance of a violation than is this 
Court. Its judgment as to the proper remedy should thus be 
• Large, multidistrict class actions, for example, often present judges 
with unique difficulties in monitoring any potential interest they may have 
in the litigation. In such cases, the judge is required to familiarize him or 
herself with the named parties and all the members of the class, which in 
an extreme case may number in the hundreds or even thousands. This 
already difficult task is confounded by the fact that the precise contours of 
the class are often not defined until well into the litigation. See Union 
Carbide Corp. v. U. S. Cutting Service, Inc., 782 F. 2d 710, 714 (CA7 
1986); In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 515 F. Supp., at 
1080. 
Of course, notwithstanding the size and complexity of the litigation, 
judges remain under a duty to stay informed of any personal or fiduciary 
financial interest they may have in cases over which they preside. See 28 
U. S. C. $ 455(c). The complexity of determining the conflict, however, 
may have a bearing on the Rule 60(bX6) extraordinary circumstance 
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ed our due consideration. A review of the facts dem-
otes that the Court of Appeals' determination that a 
rial is in order is well supported, 
tion 455 does not, on its own, authorize the reopening of 
I litigation. However, as respondent and the Court of 
lis recognized, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
ies a procedure whereby, in appropriate cases, a party 
t>e relieved of a final judgment.10 In particular, Rule 
6), upon which respondent relies, grants federal courts 
I authority to relieve a party from a final judgment 
I such terms as are just," provided that the motion is 
within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of 
rounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through 
." The rule does not particularize the factors that 
y relief, but we have previously noted that it provides 
s with authority "adequate to enable them to vacate 
nents whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish 
re," Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614-615 
i), while also cautioning that it should only be applied 
extraordinary circumstances," Ackermann v. United 
», 340 U. S. 193 (1950). Rule 60(b)(6) relief is accord-
neither categorically available nor categorically unavail-
for all § 455 violations. We conclude that in determining 
her a judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455, 
ippropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties 
e particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will 
uce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining 
mblic's confidence in the judicial process. We must con-
>usly bear in mind that 'to perform its high function in 
>est way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice/ " 
? Murchison, 349 U. S. 133,136 (1955) (citation omitted). 
ke the Court of Appeals, we accept the District Court's 
ng that while the case was actually being tried Judge 
ederal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in relevant part: 
notion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
>r the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus-
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
ave been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
aud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
>r (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons 
2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or pro-
ng was entered or taken." 
n Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601,613 (1949), we held that a 
f may *iiot avail himself of the broad 'any other reason' clause of 6(Xbr 
motion is based on grounds specified in clause (1)—"mistake, inadver-
B, surprise or excusable neglect." Rather, "extraordinary circum-
»esn are required to bring the motion within the "other reason" lan-
ne and to prevent clause (6) from being used to circumvent the 1-year 
ations period that applies to clause (1). This logic, of course, extends 
>nd clause (1) and suggests that clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) 
mutually exclusive. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
Procedure § 2864 (1973). We conclude that the basis for relief in this 
is extraordinary and that the motion was thus proper under clause (6). 
infra, at — . Of particular importance, this is not a case in-
ing neglect or lack of due diligence by respondent. Any such neglect 
ither chargeable to Judge Collins. Had he informed the parties of his 
eiation with Loyola and of Loyola's interest in the litigation on March 
1982, when his knowledge of the University's interest was renewed, 
xmdent could have raised the issue in a motion for a new trial or on 
eal without requiring that the case be reopened. Moreover, even if 
xmdent had taken the unusual step of reviewing the Judge's financial 
iosure forms—which reveal that he was a member of the Board of 
stees—the conflict would not have been brought to its attention. The 
diet arose not simply from the Judge's service on the Board of Trustees, 
from his service on the Board while the University was involved in its 
lings with Liljeberg. This latter fact would not have been made ap-
ent through examination of the disclosure reports and, according to 
oondent. was not a matter of public record at the time the case was 
Collins did not have actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in 
the dispute over the ownership of St. Jude and its precious 
certificate of need. When a busy federal judge concentrates 
his or her full attention on a pending case, personal concerns 
are easily forgotten. The problem, however, is that people 
who have not served on the bench are often all too willing 
to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of 
judges." The very purpose of §455(a) is to promote confi-
dence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of im-
propriety whenever possible. See S. Rep. No 93-419, at 5; 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5. Thus, it is critically impor-
tant in a case of this kind to identify the facts that might rea-
sonably cause an objective observer to question Judge Col-
lins' impartiality. There are at least four such facts. 
First, it is remarkable that the judge, who had regularly 
attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees since 1977, 
completely forgot about the University's interest in having a 
hospital constructed on its property in Kenner. The impor-
tance of the project to the University is indicated by the fact 
that the 80-acre parcel, which represented only about 40% 
of the entire tract owned by the University, was sold for 
$6,694,000 and that the rezoning would substantially increase 
the value of the remaining 60%. The "negotiations with the 
developers of the St. Jude Hospital" were the subject of dis-
cussion and formal action by the trustees at a meeting at-
tended by Judge Collins only a few days before the lawsuit 
was filed. App. 35. 
Second, it is an unfortunate coincidence that although the 
judge regularly attended the meetings of the Board of Trust-
ees, he was not present at the January 28, 1982, meeting, a 
week after the 2-day trial and while the case was still under 
advisement. The minutes of that meeting record that repre-
sentatives of the University monitored the progress of the 
trial, but did not see fit to call to the judge's attention the 
obvious conflict of interest that resulted firom having a Uni-
versity trustee preside over that trial. These minutes were 
mailed to Judge Collins on March 12,1982. If the Judge had 
opened that envelope when he received it on March 14th or 
15th, he would have been under a duty to recuse himself 
before he entered judgment on March 16. * 
* As we held in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813 (1986), this 
concern has constitutional dimensions. In that case we wrote: 
"We conclude that Justice Emory's participation in this case violated ap-
pellant's due process rights as explicated in Tumey, Murchison, and Word. 
We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice 
Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the 
Supreme Court of Alabama4 "would offer a possible temptation to the aver-
age [judge]. . . [to] lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."' 
The Due Process Clause inay sometimes bar trial by judges who have no 
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice 
equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in 
the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'" Id., at 
825. (citations omitted). 
A finding by another judge—faced with the the difficult task of passing 
upon the integrity of a fellow member of the bench—that his or her col-
league merely possessed constructive knowledge, and not actual knowl-
edge, is unlikely to significantly quell the concerns of the skeptic. 
"One of the provisions of the contract between Loyola and Liljeberg is 
also remarkable. Despite the fact that earlier minutes of the Board make 
it clear that the University's interest in serious negotiations with Liljeberg 
was conditioned upon the certificate of need, the contract expressly recites 
that control of the certificate was the subject of pending litigation and then 
provides "that this sale shall not be in any way conditioned upon" the out-
come of that litigation. App. 55. The University, however, retained the 
right to repurchase the property if Liljeberg was unable to go forward with 
the hospital project. If Liljeberg was found not to control the certificate 
of need, he, at least arguably, would have been precluded from going for-
ward with the hospital. Moreover, if the parties simply wanted to make 
the transaction unconditional, they could have omitted any reference to the 
litigation. An objective observer might reasonably question why the par-
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Third, it is remarkable—and quite inexcusable—that 
Judge Collins failed to recuse himself on March 24, 1982. A 
ftdl disclosure at that time would have completely removed 
any basis for questioning the Judge's impartiality and would 
have made it possible for a different judge to decide whether 
the interests—and appearance—of justice would have been 
served by a retrial. Another 2-day evidentiary hearing 
would surely have been less burdensome and less embarrass-
ing than the protracted proceedings that resulted from Judge 
Collins' nonrecusal and nondisclosure. Moreover, as the 
Court of Appeals correctly noted, Judge Collins' failure to 
disqualify himself on March 24, 1982, also constituted a vio-
lation of § 455(b)(4), which disqualifies a judge if he "knows 
that he, individually or as a fiduciary, . . . has a financial 
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to 
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." This sepa-
rate violation of §455 further compels the conclusion that 
vacatur was an appropriate remedy; by his silence, Judge 
Collins deprived respondent of a basis for making a timely 
motion for a new trial and also deprived it of an issue on 
direct appeal.14 
Fourth, when respondent filed its motion to vacate, Judge 
Collins gave three reasons for denying the motion,18 but still 
did not acknowledge that he had known about the Universi-
ty's interest both shortly before and shortly after the trial. 
Nor did he indicate any awareness of a duty to recuse himself 
in March of 1982. 
These facts create precisely the kind of appearance of im-
propriety that § 455(a) was intended to prevent. The viola-
tion is neither insubstantial nor excusable. Although Judge 
Collins did not know of his fiduciary interest in the litigation, 
he certainly should have known. In fact, his failure to stay 
informed of this fiduciary interest, may well constitute a sep-
arate violation of §455. See § 455(c). Moreover, providing 
relief in cases such as this will not produce injustice in other 
cases; to the contrary, the Court of Appeals' willingness to 
enforce § 455 may prevent a substantive injustice in some fu-
ture case by encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully 
examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly 
disclose them when discovered. It is therefore appropriate 
to vacate the judgment unless it can be said that respondent 
did not make a timely request for relief, or that it would 
otherwise be unfair to deprive the prevailing party of its 
judgment. 
If we focus on fairness to the particular litigants, a careful 
study of Judge Rubin's analysis of the merits of the underly-
ing litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of unfair-
ness in upholding the judgment in favor of Liljeberg than 
there is in allowing a new judge to take a fresh look at the 
"We note that the Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided panel. The 
majority opinion relied extensively on the deference due a trial court as to 
its findings of fact. Although it is now too late to determine what effect 
this additional argument might have had on the decision, it is certainly 
within the realm of the possible that the court's decision would have been 
swayed. 
* These were his three reasons: 
"First, Loyola University was not and is not a party to this litigation, nor 
was any of its real estate the subject matter of this controversy. Second, 
Loyola University is a non-profit, educational institution, and any bene-
fits inuring to that institution would not benefit any individual personally. 
Finally, and most significantly, this Judge never served on either the Real 
Estate or Executive Committees of the Loyola University Board of Trust-
ees. Thus, this Judge had no participation of any kind in negotiating Loy-
ola University's real estate transactions and, in fact, had no knowledge of 
issues.16 Moreover, neither Liljeberg nor Loyola University 
has made a showing of special hardship by reason of their re-
liance on the original judgment." Finally, although a delay 
of 10 months after the affirmance by the Court of Appeals 
would normally foreclose relief based on a violation of 
§ 465(a), in this case the entire delay is attributable to Judge 
Collins* inexcusable failure to disqualify himself on March 24, 
1982; had he recused himself on March 24, or even disclosed 
Loyola's interest in the case at that time, the motion could 
have been made less than 10 days after the entry of judg-
ment. "The guiding consideration is that the administration 
of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as 
well as be so in fact." Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 
343 U. S. 451, 466-467 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., in chambers). 
In sum, we conclude that Chief Judge Clark's opinion of the 
Court of Appeals reflects an eminently sound and wise dispo-
sition of this case. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE 
and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. 
* In an unpublished opinion a majority of the Court of Appeals concluded 
that Judge Collins' findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. In dissent, 
Judge Rubin expressed the opinion that "Liljeberg's chicanery," id., at 
78a, gave rise to an estoppel as a matter of law. He wrote: 
"Whether Lujeberg consciously intended to mislead HAI we need not de-
cide. His decision to sign and return the agreement knowing that HAI 
believed it to be sufficient to transfer 'ownership' makes it clear that he 
was willing to mislead HAI. . . . 
"HAI was misled by Lujeberg's silence into doing what it would not other-
wise have done: filing the application for a certificate of need. The HAI 
witnesses all testified that the company never filed an application unless it 
wholly controlled the filing corporation; Liljeberg testified that he was 
aware of that policy.1" Id., at 76a-77a. 
At this point, Judge Rubin inserted the following footnote: 
*"That HAI was misled is clear from the face of the application. HAI 
there described St. Jude as a Vholly-owned subsidiary.' Indeed, the en-
tire 407-page application is devoted to describing HAI, its hospitals, its 
management experience, and its assets. Liljeberg's name appears only in 
three letters of intent to file an application for a certificate of need dated 
before July, 1980, and on a copy of the Warranty and Indemnity Agree-
ment. HAI also changed the name of St. Jude's registered agent, further 
demonstrating its belief that it controlled St. Jude." Id., at 77a, n. 8. 
Judge Rubin then continued: 
"Therefore, Lujeberg's silence at the time he signed the warranty agree-
ment should estop him from claiming that the agreement, read in conjunc-
tion with the HAI cover letter and Douglas' letter enclosing corporate doc-
uments, did not transfer control of St. Jude to HAI. However, because 
Lujeberg's deception did not end there, the estoppel need not rest on that 
alone. 
"Liljeberg signed the March 16, 1981 commission agreement which 
stated that he was to receive $250,000 (plus interest) only if HAI received 
final section 1122 approval. After the certificate of need was issued, Lilje-
berg requested and received the commission, which, when paid, amounted 
to $271,000. In relieving Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), HAI's 
successor, of $271,000, Liljeberg never mentioned his contention that 
be still 'owned' St. Jude, and that St. Jude, not HAI, had received the 
certificate. . . . 
"HAI relied on Liljeberg's agreement that it owned St. Jude in buying 
the property on which the hospital was to be built. HCA justifiably relied 
on Lujeberg's agreement that it owned St. Jude in paying the commission." 
Id., at 77a-78a. 
nIn fact, Liljeberg's ownership of the certificate of need has never been 
entirely settled. On January 31,1983, just two weeks after the Fifth Cir-
cuit's judgment affirming Judge Collins on the merits became final, re-
spondent filed suit against St. Jude and various federal and state agencies. 
The new action alleges that the certificate was improperly issued in the 
name of St. Jude and that respondent is instead entitled to the certificate. 
See Health Services Acquisition Corporation v. Guissinger, Civil Action 
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g Court's decision in this case is long on ethics in the ab-
t, but short on workable rules of law. The Court first 
that 28 U. S. C. §455(a) can be used to disqualify a 
> on the basis of facts not known to the judge himself, 
en broadens the standard for overturning final judg-
s under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Be-
these results are at odds with the intended scope of 
and Rule 60(b), and are likely to cause considerable mis-
when courts attempt to apply them, I dissent. 
I 
detailed in the Court's opinion, § 455(a) provides that 
y justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall 
aHfy himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
t reasonably be questioned." Section 455 was substan-
revised by Congress in 1974 to conform with the re-
y adopted Canon 3C of the American Bar Association's 
of Judicial Conduct (1974). Previously, a federal judge 
•equired to recuse himself when he had a substantial in-
t in the proceedings, or when "in his opinion" it was im-
ir for him to hear the case.1 Subsection (a) was drafted 
Diace the subjective standard of the old disqualification 
Le with an objective test. Congress hoped that this ob-
e standard would promote public confidence in the 
tiality of the judicial process by instructing a judge, 
confronted with circumstances in which his impartiality 
reasonably be doubted, to disqualify himself and allow 
er judge to preside over the case.* The amended stat-
so had the effect of removing the so-called "duty to sit," 
i had become an accepted gloss on the existing statute.3 
s^ection (b) of § 455 sets forth more particularized situa-
in which a judge must disqualify himself. Congress in-
d the provisions of § 455(b) to remove any doubt about 
al in cases where a judge's interest is too closely con-
d with the litigation to allow his participation. Subsec-
b)(4), for example, disqualifies a jurist if he knows that 
s spouse, or his minor children have a financial interest 
subject matter in controversy. Unlike the more open-
I provision adopted in subsection (a), the language of 
ction (b) requires recusal only in specific circumstances, 
> phrased in such a way as to suggest a requirement of 
[ knowledge of the disqualifying circumstances. 
\ purpose of § 455 is obviously to inform judges of what 
rs they must consider in deciding whether to recuse 
selves in a given case. The Court here holds, as did the 
of Appeals below, that a judge must recuse himself 
• § 455(a) if he should have known of the circumstances 
-ing disqualification, even though in fact he did not 
of them. I do not believe this is a tenable construction 
predecessor statute, which had been part of the United States 
Mr 60 years, stated: 
Interest of justice or judge, 
r justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has 
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or 
>rney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the 
ppeal, or other proceeding therein." 28 U. S. C. § 455 (1970 ed.). 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1974). See also Bloom, Judicial 
nd Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal 
, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662, 670-676 (1985); Comment, Disquali-
i of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236, 
2 (1978). 
He § 455 provides guidance to a judge when he is considering recus-
iself, 28 U. S. C. § 144 supplies a litigant with the opportunity to file 
iavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a per-
ias or prejudice sufficient to mandate disqualification. Respondent 
of subsection (a). A judge considering whether or not to re-
cuse himself is necessarily limited to those facts bearing on 
the question of which he has knowledge. To hold that dis-
qualification is required by reason of facts which the judge 
does not know, even though he should have known of them, is 
to posit a conundrum which is not decipherable by ordinary 
mortals. While the concept of "constructive knowledge" is 
useful in other areas of the law, I do not think it should be 
imported into § 455(a). 
At the direction of the Court of Appeals, Judge Schwartz 
of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
made factual findings concerning the extent and timing of 
Judge Collins* knowledge of Loyola's interest in the underly-
ing lawsuit. See ante, at 2-3. Judge Schwartz determined 
that Judge Collins had no actual knowledge of Loyola's in-
volvement when he tried the case. Not until March 24, 
1982, when he reviewed materials in preparation for a Board 
meeting, did Judge Collins obtain actual knowledge of the ne-
gotiations between petitioners and Loyola. 
Despite this factual determination, reached after a public 
hearing on the subject, the Court nevertheless concludes that 
"public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary" com-
pels retroactive disqualification of Judge Collins under 
8455(a). This conclusion interprets § 455(a) in a manner 
which Congress never intended. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, in drafting § 455(a) Congress was concerned with the 
"appearance" of impropriety, and to that end changed the 
previous subjective standard for disqualification to an objec-
tive one; no longer was disqualification to be decided on the 
basis of the opinion of the judge in question, but by the stand-
ard of what a reasonable person would think. But the facts 
and circumstances which this reasonable person would con-
sider must be the facts and circumstances known to the judge 
at the time. In short, as is unquestionably the case with 
subsection (b), I would adhere to a standard of actual knowl-
edge in § 455(a), and not slide off into the very speculative 
ground of "constructive" knowledge. 
II 
The Court then compounds its error by allowing Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to be used to set aside a final 
judgment in this case. Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court, 
on motion and upon such terms as are just, to relieve a party 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for any "reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." How-
ever, we have repeatedly instructed that only truly "extraor-
dinary circumstances" will permit a party successfully to in-
voke the "any other reason" clause of § 60(b). See Klapprott 
v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949); see also 
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950). 
This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the 
finality of judgments is to be preserved. 
For even if one accepts the Court's proposition that § 455(a) 
permits disqualification on the basis of a judge's constructive 
knowledge, Rule 60(b)(6) should not be used in this case to 
apply § 455(a) retroactively to Judge Collins' participation in 
the lawsuit. In the first place, it is beyond cavil that Judge 
Collins stood to receive no personal financial gain from the 
transactions involving petitioner, respondent, and Loyola. 
Judge Collins' only prior tie to the dealings was as a member 
of Loyola's rather large Board of Trustees and, although 
Judge Collins was a member of at least two of the Board's 
subcommittees, he had no connection with the Real Estate 
subcommittee, the entity responsible for negotiating the sale 
of the Monroe Tract. In addition, the motion to set aside the 
judgment was made by respondent almost 10 months after 
6-14-88 The United States LAW WEEK 56 LV 4 6 4 5 
Rule 60(b)(6) is subject to no absolute time limitation, there 
can be no serious argument that the time elapsed since the 
entry of judgment must weigh heavily in considering the mo-
tion. Finally, and most important, Judge Schwartz deter-
mined that Judge Collins did not have actual knowledge of his 
conflict of interest during trial and that he made no rulings 
after he acquired actual knowledge.4 I thus think it very 
unlikely that respondent was subjected to substantial injus-
tice by Judge Collins' failure to recuse himself, and believe 
that the majority's use of Rule 60(b)(6) retroactively to set 
aside the underlying judgment is therefore unwarranted. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
For the reasons given by CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, 
ante, at , I agree that "constructive knowledge" cannot 
be the basis for a violation of 28 U. S. C. § 455(a). The ques-
tion then remains whether respondent is entitled to a new 
trial because there are other "extraordinary circumstances," 
apart from the § 455(a) violation found by the Fifth Circuit, 
that justify "relief from operation of the judgment." See 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6); Ackermann v. United States, 
340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), Klapprott v. United States, 335 
U. S. 601, 613 (1949). Although the Court collects an im-
pressive array of arguments that might support the granting 
of such relief, I believe the issue should be addressed in the 
first instance by the courts below. I would therefore re-
mand this case with appropriate instructions. 
H BARTOW FARR III, Washington, DC (A J SCHMITT JR , 
MELVIN W MATHES, SCHMITT & MATHES, and ONEK 
KLEIN & FARR, on the briefs) for petitioner, WILLIAM M 
LUCAS JR , Neu Orleans, La (JOYCE M DOMBOURIAN, LU-
CAS & ROSEN, CURTIS R BOISFONTAINE, KATHRYN J 
LICHTENBERG, and SESSIONS, FISHMAN, ROSENSON, 
BOISFONTAINE, NATHAN & WINN, on the briefs) for 
respondent 
Nos 86-1992 AND 86-2019 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 
PETITIONER 
86-1992 v. 
ANTOLIN PUNSALAN PANGILINAN ET AL. 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 
PETITIONER 
86-2019 v. 
BONIFACIO LORENZANA MANZANO 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No 86-1992 Argued February 24, 1988-Decided June 17, 1988* 
Respondents, 16 Filipino nationals, seek United States citizenship pursu-
ant to 55 701 through 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended in 
4
 The majority's opinion suggests a number of troubling hypothetical 
situations, only one of which will demonstrate the difficulties inherent in its 
decision Suppose Judge Doe sits on a bench trial involving X Corp andY 
Corp. The judge rules for X Corp , and judgment is affirmed on appeal 
Ten years later, officials at Y Corp learn that, unbeknownst to him, Judge 
Doe owned several shares of stock in X Corp Even in the face of an inde-
pendent factual finding that Judge Doe had no knowledge of this owner-
ship, the Court's construction of 5 455(a) and Rule 60(b) would permit the 
final judgment in X Corp 's favor to be set aside if the "appearance of 
impartiality" were not deemed wholly satisfied Such a result will ad-
versely affect the reliance placed on final judgments and will inhibit devel-
opments premised on their finality 
•Together with No 86-2019, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
1942. Under § 702 of the Act, the Commissioner of Immigration and 
Naturalization was authorized to designate representatives to receive 
petitions, conduct hearings, and grant naturalization outside the United 
States In August 1945, the American Vice Consul in Manila was desig-
nated pursuant to § 702 to naturalize aliens The Philippine Govern-
ment, however, expressed its concern that a mass migration of newly 
naturalized veterans would dram the soon-to-be independent country's 
manpower, and so the naturalization officer's authority was revoked for 
a nine-month period between October 1945 and August 1946 Respond-
ents would have been eligible for citizenship under the provisions of the 
1940 Act if they had filed naturalization applications before the Act ex-
pired on December 31, 1946, but did not do so More than 30 years 
later, they petitioned for naturalization, claiming that the nine-month ab-
sence of a 5 702 naturalization officer violated the 1940 Act and deprived 
them of rights secured by the Fifth Amendment The naturalization ex-
aminer, in all of the cases consolidated here, recommended against natu-
ralization, and the District Courts rejected the naturalization petitions 
On respondents' appeals (some of which were consolidated), heard in two 
cases by different Ninth Circuit panels, the Court of Appeals ultimately 
held that the revocation of the Vice Consul's naturalization authority 
violated what it characterized as the 1940 Act's mandatory language, 
and that the naturalization of respondents was an appropriate equitable 
remedy 
Held. 
1. Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation 
of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power 
to confer citizenship in violation of the limitations imposed by Congress 
in the exercise of its exclusive constitutional authority over naturaliza-
tion. Since respondents have no current statutory right to citizenship 
under the expired provisions of the 1940 Act, the Nmth Circuit lacked 
authority to grant the petitions for naturalization The reasoning of 
INS v. Hibi, 414 U S 5—which held that the same official acts as those 
alleged here did not give rise to an estoppel that prevented the Govern-
ment from invoking the December 31,1946, cutoff date m the 1940 Act — 
suggests the same result as to the "equitable remedy" theory in this 
case Even assuming that, in reviewing naturalization petitions, federal 
courts sit as courts of equity, such courts can no more disregard statu-
tory provisions than can courts of law Congress has given the power to 
the federal courts to make someone a citizen as a specific function to be 
performed in strict compliance with the terms of 8 U S C § 1421(d), 
which states that a person may be naturalized "in the manner and 
under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter, and not otherwise " 
2. Assuming that respondents can properly mvoke the Constitution's 
protections, and granting that they had statutory entitlements to natu-
ralization, there is no merit to their contention that the revocation of the 
Vice Consul's naturalization authority deprived them of their rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under its 
equal protection component Respondents were not entitled to individ-
ualized notice of any statutory rights and to the continuous presence of a 
naturalization officer in the Philippines from October 1945 until July 
1946 Moreover, the historical record does not support the contention 
that the actions at issue here were motivated by any racial animus 
8. There is no merit to the separate arguments of respondents 
Litonjua and Manzano, including the argument that the Government did 
not introduce any evidence in their cases concerning the historical events 
at issue It is well settled that the bujxlen is on the alien applicant to 
establish his eligibility for citizenship 
796 F 2d 1091, reversed 
SCALIA, J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 
C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ , 
joined BLACKMUN, J , concurred in the result KENNEDY, J , took no 
part in the consideration or decision of the case 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The respondents, 16 Filipino nationals who served with the 
United States Armed Forces during World War II, claim 
they are entitled to apply for and receive American citizen-
ship under a special immigration statute that expired over 40 
years ago, §§701 to 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. 
L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended by the Second War 
Powers Act of 1942, § 1001, Pub. L. 77-507, 56 Stat. 182, 
o TT c r ainni noan *H q„nn V) H940 Act). In the 
